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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BANK OF VERNAL,
Plaintiff and Respondent}
-vs.-

UINTAH COUNTY,
Defendant,

Case Nos.
7794 and 7795

P. H. LOWE,
Defendant and Appellant,
,T_A_LBORG B. T. LOWE,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's statement
of facts only insofar as it is concerned with a description of the location of the tract of land in question, the
course of legal action taken by the parties, and the facts
connected with the tax assessments pertaining to the land
in question.
Miss Valborg B. T. Lowe at one time owned the property in question, consisting of four forty acre tracts as
appellant states. She mortgaged the property to one
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I-Ierron who purchased it on foreclosure on December 2,
1932. (Abstract Entry No. 17.) In 1933 and 19J4 Miss
Lowe claimed an interest in the land under a lease with
an option to buy from Herron. On April19, 1934, Herron
mortgaged the land to the Bank of Vernal which bought
the land on foreclosure on August 19, 1939 (Tr. 55, 56,
Abstract of Title Entry 27), the Sheriff's deed to the
plaintiff Bank being dated March 1, 1940 (Abstract Entry
No. 32). On May 21, 1945, a tax deed to the land was
issued by Uintah County to defendant P. H. Lowe (Abstract Entry No. 28) which tax title, as respondent will
show is fatally defective.
Defendant grazed stock on the land in question in a
more or less desultory manner. He grazed sheep at times
but not even "most of the time" (Tr. 76) and cattle in
like n1anner (Tr. 76, 77, 103).
For many years the land in question has been more
or less fenced. There was a fence in place along the north
and west sides, at least, twenty five years ago (Tr. 86,
132, 133, 168). Defendant's sole activity in regard to fencing the property has been to repair existing fencing (Tr.
164, et seq.). The present fences are not tight and would
not turn either sheep or cattle (Tr. 163). Defendant, himself, testified to the necessity for herding the stock to
keep it from straying (Tr. 68). The property is not entirely fenced ( Tr. 184) but opens not only onto defendant's home ranch but also onto other open range land
(Tr. 186, 187). It is true that Valborg Lowe purchased
$400.00 worth of wire in one instance as appellants claim;
however, none of this lot of wire had been used for fenc-
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ing this property at the thne of the trial. Only a portion
of other 'v-ire 'v-hirh the testin1ony shows 'vas purchased
by , ... alborg Lo,ve has been used to repair fences on the
land in question ( Tr. 17 4).
Defendant did not begin to clain1 the land in question
as his own until after acquiring the tax deed in 1945 (Tr.
92, 160) .
. A. ny interest , . . alborg Lowe claimed was through and
by virtue of her dealings "\Vith Herron and subject to the
Bank's claim (Tr. 112, 158). Defendant, P. H. Lowe,
knew that his sister, \ ...alborg Lowe, claimed the land
and that she claimed it by reason of an agreement with
Herron subject to the lien of the Bank ( Tr. 112). The
sole 'vay in which he claimed an interest was through
his sister; i.e., if his sister had an interest he then claimed
an interest in that belonging to her (Tr. 113). Valborg
Lowe claimed the land in question and the sheep mentioned as grazing thereon as her assets in debtor's relief
in 1940. P. H. Lowe knew she had done so and made no
objection (Tr. 117).
At various times officers of plaintiff Bank were on
the land in question for the purpose of talking to P. H.
Lowe and Valborg Lowe about the land in question and
the financial obligations of the Lowes in re·gard thereto
(Tr. 107, 148, 149, 161). P. H. Lowe saw three of the
Bank's officers at his home immediately adjoining the
tract in question in 1940 (Tr. 107). In 1940 he also saw
a Mr. Stahler representing the sheriff of Uintah County
at his horne and knew that Mr. Stahler had come to take
certain sheep into custody (Tr. 108). N. J. Meagher, as
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cashier of plaintiff Bank was on the land in 1940 at which
ti1ne the Bank held title to the land (Tr. 148). He had
Inany conversations with Valborg Lowe relative to the
land in question and her interest therein from 1933 on
( Tr. 156 et seq.). In each instance the interest claimed
by \ralborg Lowe was that acquired under an agreement
\vith Herron and subject to the Bank's mortgage. Also
at each instance she made it clear that she was dealing
\vith the Bank on her own behalf, not for her brother (Tr.
159).
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT
WERE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
SHOULD BE UPHELD.

II.
THAT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT AS TO DEFENDANT P. H. LOWE'S CROSS-COMPLAINT, SAID P. H. LOWE
HAS NO CLAIM OR INTEREST OR ESTATE IN SAID
PROPERTY AND IS WITHOUT ANY RIGHT WHATEVER,
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

III.
THAT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT IT IS TRUE
THAT PLAINTIFF BANK OF VERNAL AND ITS PREDECESSORS IN TITLE AND INTEREST ARE NOW AND HAVE
BEEN IN THE ACTUAL POSSESSION TO THE ABOVE
DESCRIBED LANDS FOR MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS
PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION AND
HAS BEEN SEIZED AND IN CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
OF THE SAME, IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
SHOULD BE UPHELD.
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IV.
THAT THE JUDGMENT AGAINST VALBORG B. T.
LOWE IS ENTIRELY PROPER INASMUCH AS SHE WAS
MADE A PARTY DEFENDANT BY STIPULATION OF THE
PARTIES AND SHOULD BE UPHELD .

.A.R.G lT~IENT

I.
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT
WERE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
SHOULD BE UPHELD.

This is a suit to quiet title to certain land and as such
it is an equitable action, 5 Pomeroy, Equity J urisprudence, 485'; 44 _._\m. Juris. 333.
Justice Wade, speaking in the recent Utah case of
Migliaccio /c. Da.vis, (J nne 8, 1951) says :
"Since in law actions there is no appeal to this
court on questions of fact, and even in equity cases
we do not disturb the trial court's findings of fact
unless they are manifestly contrary to the weight
of the evidence, to thus nullify such findings is
contrary to any recognized practice in this state."
Justice Wade further stated that the findings of fact
must be upheld if such facts can be reasonably found
from the evidence, or are not manifestly contrary thereto.
The trial court is in a position to evaluate the evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. To add
further strength to this p-oint, in the case under consideration the court viewed the premises as is shown on the
record (Tr. 170).
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From the foregoing it appears that if there is evidence in the record from which the findings of fact made
by the trial court could reasonably be found, then they
should be upheld. In the present case there is ample
evidence to support each and every finding of fact made
by the trial court.
No question has been raised as to findings of fact
numbers one through four relating to the chain of title
to the land in question.
Appellants have attacked the findings of fact upon
the grounds that the title to the land should be quieted
in defendant P. H. Lowe on the basis of adverse possession; that the claim of plaintiff, Bank of Vernal, is barred
by the statute of limitations; and that as to appellant
V alborg Lowe, the decree granted by the trial court
should be dismissed for the reason that she was not a
party defendant. These points of attack respondent will
consider in order.

II.
THAT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT AS TO DEFENDANT P. H. LOWE'S CROSS-COMPLAINT, SAID P. H. LOWE
HAS NO CLAIM OR INTEREST OR ESTATE IN SAID
PROPERTY AND IS WITHOUT ANY RIGHT WHATEVER,
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

The Statutes of Utah regarding adverse possession
require that the property:
(1) be protected by a substantial enclosure,
(2) be usually cultivated or improved,
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(3) have labor or n1oney expended upon da1ns,
canals, en1banlnnents, aqueducts or other,vise for the purpose of irrigating such lands an1ounting to the sum of
$5.00 per acre. (Session La \\~S of Utah, section 104-12-11,
ch. 58, p. 183).
(4) The land n1ust have been occupied and claimed
for seven years continuously and the claiinant, his predecessors and grantors must have paid all taxes which
have been levied and assessed upon such land according
to law. (Session la"~s of Utah, section 104-12-12, ch. 58, p.
183).
(5) The possession 1nust have been for the whole
period, actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous and
hostile to the true owner's title and under claim of right
or color of title. 1 Am. Jur. 793.
Defendant P. H. Lowe has not established a claim
by adverse possession under the above provisions.
SUBSTANTIAL ENC·LOSURE
Defendant has not effected a substantial enclosure of
the property in question. The act of enclosure is important, among other reasons, as an indication of possession.
1 Am. Juris. 869. In the present instance the fences which
are in position were not erected by defendant; but, in
fact, were built at least twenty five years ago (Tr. 86).
There is clear evidence that the land was fenced along
the highway and west sides many years ago (Tr. 86, 133,
168). The fences have never been tight along the east side
of the tract, and even the south side, is not completely
fenced (Tr. 184, 186, 187). Valborg Lowe testified that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
the land was already fenced in 1917 (Tr. 132) and that
there have always been the same fencelines (Tr. 133).
The only evidence as to fencing was that there was a
eertain amount of repair of existing fences but there is
ahsolutely no evidence of the erection of new boundary
fences which would act as a substantial enclosure of land
claimed.
The lack of any evidence regarding the enclosing of
the property by the defendant is so marked that we actually find the following statement made by defendant's
counsel in reply to a question by the court.
"THE COURT: And wasn't any intent on
your part to show that any expenditure had been
made by him or any fence had been put up by
him~

"MR. CLAWSON: That is correct, sir."
According to defendant's own testimony all he has
done in respect to protecting the property by a substantial enclosure was to put in "a few posts" and make repairs once in awhile ( Tr. 164). Defendant's statement
that he put up 60 rods of wire in 1948 can not he considered since it apparently was done after this action was
commenced (Tr. 165, 166). Defendant's testimony as to
setting an additional twenty five posts must also be disregarded since this was done a full three years after the
commencement of this action (Tr. 166). There was some
testimony to the effect that Valborg Lowe purchased wire
for fencing but as of the time of the trial in 1951, it had
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9
not been used and 'vas, in fact, still in rolls on the Lowe
hon1e ranch (Tr. 17~, 174).
Since no ne'v fencing has been erected, no notice or
evidence of defendant's possession is given by "enclosure."
The enclosing of land by another will not give a
claimant the right to the land by adverse possession as
shown in the case of Peterson -~·. Johnson, 84 Utah, 89,
34 Pac. (2d) 697, which was an action to establish title to
property in 'vhich defendant claimed title by adverse possession. It "\Yas decided that evidence that claimant's predecessors enclosed within a fence a strip of land not
covered by the defendant's deed and that such fence had
been maintained for a long period of time did not vest
title to such land in the claimant.
It has been decided in Utah that enclosure of the
land is essential in establishing adverse possession in a
case such as tllis. In the case of Central Pac. Ry. v. Tarpey et al, 51 1Itah 107, 168 Pac., 554, 556, 1 A.L.R. 1319,
the court stated:
"But where the claim of title is not founded
upon a written instrument but is based entirely
upon actual possession of every part of the land,
the requirement that the land be protected by a
substantial enclosure, or that it has been usually
cultivated or improved, or money expended upon
it for irrigation as provided in that section is imperative by necessity."
There is here no claim of cultivation or improvement
of the land or money expended for irrigation; therefore,
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proof of substantial enclosure must appear conclusively
to support defendant's claim.
Where enclosure is essential or relied upon as evidence of possession it must be complete and so open and
notorious as to charge the owner with knowledge thereof. 1 Am. Juris. 869. As shown above, defendant did no
1nore than make repairs to existing fences so there can
be no contention that the enclosing was so open and
notorious as to charge plaintiff with notice.
The enclosure of the tract in question was not complete. No fence had ever been erected along the lower
east boundary ( Tr. 184). The mere fact that the tract
in question adjoins the home ranch of the defendant on
the east is no excuse or reason to ignore the fact that the
land claimed by adverse possession was not enclosed
along that side. As the court said in the case of Central
Pac. Ry. et al. v. Tarpey, supra, the land claimed by adverse. possession must be completely enclosed to establish
the exact boundaries of the property claimed, among ·
other reasons. The tract in question opens not only onto
the horne ranch of P. H. Lowe but also directly onto open
range land ( Tr. 1'86, 187). This makes the so-called enclosure far from complete. Thus we see that the enclosure
claimed by defendant to establish his claim by adverse
possession lacks two of the essential features, that it be
so open and notorious as to give notice of claimant's
possession and that it be complete.
Such fences as are in position on the land are neither
substantial nor tight. The Utah Court in the, Central Pac.
v. Tarpey case specifically stated that the imperative
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necessity 'vas a substantial Enclosure. On this point P.
H. Lo,ve testified as to fence posts:
"•So1ne are fifteen and some are about thirty
(feet), I guess. Supposed to be another post in
bet,veen" (Tr. 87).
Certainly this cannot be considered a tight fence or a
substantial one.
N. J. Meagher testified that he is and has been personally acquainted 'vith the tract and the fences thereon
and that they are and have been in very poor condition
and would not turn either sheep or cattle (Tr. 163). The
very description of the fences as testified to (Tr. 61, 62,
63) as simply two strands of barbed wire indicates anything but a tight, substantial fence.
P. H. Lowe testified that the land was used solely to
pasture sheep and cattle (Tr. 67, 74). He further stated
that when the sheep were on at least part of the tract he
had to herd them all the time although on fenced land
this was unnecessary (Tr. 68). It is well settled that the
enclosure should be appropriate to fit the premises for
the use to which the occupant desired to put them. 1 Am.
Juris. 870. Clearly, if these fences are not such as would
turn stock, are so poor that the stock must be constantly
herded when the land is to be used only for grazing, and,
further do not completely enclose the property, they do
not fulfill the requirements of the statutes.
CONTINUOUS USE
The land must have been occupied and claimed con-
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tinuously for seven years. (Session Laws of Utah, 10412-12).
Since this land was not residential property, the occupation thereof must be based upon the use to which it
was put. Defendant testified that it was used only for
pasture and grazing for sheep and cattle (Tr. 74) but he
did not graze sheep there all the ~ti~e (Tr. 75). P. H.
Lowe testified as to sheep:

"Q. Do you have some of them down there all the
time~

A. No, not all the time.
Q. Most of the time~
A. No, I wouldn't say most of the time." (Tr. 76)
and later:
"Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Are the cattle down there all the time~
No, not all the time.
Not all the time~
No.
Most of the time~
No.
What part of the time~
Well mostly during the summer be a few
there." (Tr. 76, 77).

P. H. Lowe again testified that cattle did not graze
continually on the tract in question (Tr. 103).
Since the property in question was contiguous to the
Lowe horne ranch merely normal husbandry would have
used the property most of the year.
Apparently, inasmuch as the land was
used by appel,
lant solely for grazing sheep and cattle, a good part of
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the tilne it 'vas not used by appellant at all since he did
not use it even Hinost of the ti1ne" for pasturing either
sheep or cattle .....\s long as the land was not used, it wa~
not occupied; therefore it "~as not ~'occupied ... for seven
years continuously" as required by statute.
COXTINlTOt'"S CLAinl
Appellant did not claiin the land for seven years
continuously as required. P. H. Lowe specifically testified that he did not begin to claim the land as his own
until after he bought the tax title from Uintah County on
~Iay ~1, 1945, and that he did not begin to run sheep
on the land as his o"""ll until 1945, ( Tr. 92) only three
years before this action was commenced. P. H. Lowe's
own statement as to his claim to the land prior to 1945
'vas: '~Oh, I figured more or less right to it. Always had.
Just as much as anybody else." (Tr. 95). In addition,
P. H. Lowe stated that he "didn't exactly claim all of it."
(Tr. 93). This certainly cannot be construed as an exclusive claim to the land nor is it hostile to the true owner
as the law requires.
Adverse possession consists not simply of possession but of a possession by the occupier claiming the land
as his own and denying the right of everybody else. Wren
v. Parker, 57 Conn. 547, 18A. 790 6 L.R.A. 80.
Appellant himself had never even ordered anyone
else to stay off the land (Tr. 95).
It appears from the cumulative testimony of the
various witnesses that the appellant, P. H. Lowe, never
did really claim the land as his. What tenuous claim was
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made appeared to be by appellant's sister, Valborg Lowe.
Even in 1945 when the tax title to the land was purchased from Uintah County, it was Miss Lowe who appeared before the Board of County Supervisors in reL..
gard to the purchase ( Tr. 106, 114, 144). P. H. Lowe
testified that his sister does not now own any of the
land in question (Tr. 90), but Miss Lowe paid taxes with
a check drawn on the Lowe Ranch, which account was set
up about 1946. Miss Lowe claimed the land among her
assets in debtor's relief, her brother knew she had, and
made no objection (Tr. 117). N.J. Meagher testified that
he had various dealings with Miss Lowe in which she
always made it clear that she was acting on her own behalf and not for her brother (Tr. 159, 160, 161). This
clearly refutes any such claim (by defendant) so open
and notorious as to give notice to the true owner. There
was not even any agreement between the Lowes as to
who actually owned the stock which grazed on the land
in question from time to time (Tr. 78, 80, 83, 85, 89).
V alborg Lowe sold the wool and paid taxes on the sheep
as a rule and· the sheep now owned by the Lowes are the
increase from those V alborg claimed as assets in debtor's
relief ( Tr. 83, 84, 90, 116, 141).
P. H. Lowe clearly stated that in 1940 he knew that
V alborg Lowe claimed the land in question, that she
claimed it subject to the lie.n of the Ba,nk of Verndl, and
tha.t she claimed it by reason of an agreement with
Herron (Tr. 112). P. H. Lowe stated that the sole claim
he made to the land was through his sister; i.e, if his
sister had an interest, then he claimed an interest in hers,
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(Tr. 113). N. J. ~Ieagher, an officer of plaintiff Bank,
stated that never to his kno"\\"ledge did P. H. Lowe clai1n
any interest in the land prior to the tax sale in 1~)-l-5 (rrr.

160) .
. .\ppellants seen1 to be atte1npting to attach too many
strings to their bow; that is, they are basing their claim
to the property in the first instance upon the exclusive
clain1 of P. H. Lo,ve, then turn to Valborg Lowe, the
sister, and, in effect say, ·',veil, if P. H. Lowe does not
claim exclusive possession, then his sister does." There
is no showing of a privity interest by the two appellants
so this attempted alternative stand is obviously untenable. Respondent, of course, applies all arguments contained herein and directed against the defendant, P. H.
Lowe; also, and with equal force to the defendant, Valborg B. T. Lowe. In other words, any claim of the defendant, ·v·alborg B. T. Lowe, fails equally with any claim
of the defendant, P. H. Lowe, as hereinabove noted.
The indefinite and confusing nature of the claims
made and the conflicting testimony relating thereto completely negates any exclusive nature in the defendant's
claim to the land thus showing the lack of one of the
essentials set forth in Wren v. Parker, supra.

PAYMENT OF TAXES
Appellants insist that they gained additional
strength to their claim by virtue of the fact that the respondent Bank did not pay taxes on the land in question.
However, the inconsistency of appellant's position is
obvious when it is noted that they go to great lengths
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to show that no taxes were legally assessed upon the
land in question during the period 1928 to 1946, inclusive.
Appellants do this to remove themselves from the
statutory requirement that one claiming land by adverse
possession must have paid all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land according to the law,
since they are in the position of not having paid the taxes
for any seven year period. It was stipulated that the taxes
from 1928 to 1946 inclusive were not legally assessed,
inasmuch as the required auditor's certificates were not
attached to the rolls (Tr. 56, 57, 58). If the taxes were not
levied according to law as to appellants then certainly
they were not levied according to law as to respondents;
therefore, this argument does nothing to advance appellants' claim. Appellants cannot in justice or reason maintain one stand for themselves and another for respondents upon the same question.

ACTUAL, OPEN, VISIBLE, NOTORIOUS HOSTILE
POSSESSION
Appellant did not show the required actual, open, visible and continuous possession (1 A.m. Juris. 795) as
respondent has shown by the foregoing, since the evidence
set forth shows that the sole possession which could possibly be claimed was the intermittent grazing of stock
without the addition of so much as a new fence to make
possession actual, open, or visible.
Appellant, P. H. Lowe, did not show any notorious
possession by him. The only evidence even remotely per-
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tinent to this point 'vas given by one single witness and
he 8tated that the general opinion was that Valborg
Lowe, the sister, rather than P. H. Lowe, owned it although P. H. Lo,ve stated his sister did not own any interest in the land thus completely contradicting his own one
'vitness on this point (Tr. 90, 131). The testimony of one
w·itness, tmder the circun1stances does not show notorious
possession. The very purpose of the requirement that the
possession be open and notorious is to give notice to the
true owner of possession of his lands by another claiming
to own them bona fide and openly. In the absence of actual notice to the owner the possession of the adverse
claimant must be so open, notorious and visible that the
owner must have known of it as a reasonable man. 1 Am.
Juris. 874, 875, Annotation, 15 L.R.A. (NS) 1178, 1200.
Here no such possession was shown .
. .-\.ppellants did not show possession hostile to the true
owner's title. It is perfectly true that the term "hostile"
as used in regard to the adverse possession of land does
not impart enmity or ill will as appellant carefully pointed out. He cites many cases to this effect with all of which
we agree. They are not adverse to respondent's case, but
rather, tend to aid it. The word "hostile" means that the
one in possession of land claims the exclusive right thereto and imports a denial of the owner's title. 1 Am. Juris.
872, Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, 37 Ut. 334, 90 Pac.
564, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 627. Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 106 S.W. 594, 599, 128 Mo. App. 96"Hostile"means opposed to and antagonistic to the claims
of all others. "Hostile" means a holding possession claim-
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ing to hold against all other claimants. Taylor v. Hover,
108 N.W. 149, 150, 77 Neb. 97.
In the case at hand P. H. Lowe clearly stated that he
only felt he had as much right as anyone else (Tr. 95)
and "didn't exactly claim all of it" (Tr. 93). He further
testified that his only claim to the land was an interest
in his sister's interest, if she had any (Tr. 113) and that
he knew his sister claimed the land by virtue of an agreement with Herron subject to the lien of the respondent
Bank ( Tr. 112). As to any notice, actual or constructive
to respondent Bank, the true owner, N. J. Meagher testified that he called upon appellants many times to discuss
their obligations in regard to the property after 1933,
(Tr. 161) in a manner which clearly indicates a lack of
notice by respondent.
From the foregoing it plainly appears that what
testimony appellants presented was conflicting and did
not support a claim to actual, open, notorious, visible
or hostile possession by P. H. Lowe.
It is true that P. H. Lowe bought the tax title to the
land in 1945. This tax title was invalid as against the
real owner, respondent Bank of Vernal. By stipulation
of the parties (Tr. 56), it appears that no auditor's certificate was attached to the tax rolls of Uintah County from
1928 to 1946 inclusive. Such a defect in the required tax
procedure will invalidate the tax deed subsequently issued as against the true owner. Toronto v. Sheffield, 222
P. ( 2d) 574, 602 (Ut. 1950) concurring opinion :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
hit is a rare case indeed where a search of the
tax procedure 'vill not disclose somewhere along
the line one or n1ore infirmities of commission or
o1nmission in the tax procedure. And almost every
type of such infermity has been held to be an infermity \vhich transcends the level of an informality in an act relating to assessment or collection of
taxes."
Utah still adheres to the rule of strictissimi juris not
'vithstanding Section 80-11-7 to the Code. See discussion
Ut Lau~ Review Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 105. Consequently, the
defects in procedure leading to the tax deed invalidates
it. Telonis c. Staley, 104 Ut. 537, 144 P. (2d) 537. Equitable Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Schoewe, 105 Ut. 569,
144 P. (2d) 526.
As we have shown appellant has not supported any
valid claim to the property in question by virtue of adverse possession.
There is a great deal of evidence in the record to
support the trial court's findings of fact that the title
of plaintiff Bank of Vernal is good and sufficient and
that appellants P. H. Lowe, Valborg B .T. Lowe or any
other person, known or unknown, have no right, title, interest, claim or estate in and to said land.

III.
THAT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT IT IS TRUE
THAT PLAINTIFF BANK OF VERNAL AND ITS PREDECESSORS IN TITLE AND INTEREST ARE NOW AND HAVE
BEEN IN THE ACTUAL POSSESSION TO THE ABOVE
DESCRIBED LANDS FOR MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS
PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION AND
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HAS BEEN SEIZED AND IN CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
OF THE SAME, IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
SHOULD BE UPHE-LD.

Appellant contends that respondent's right to maintain this action is barred by the statute of limitations.
The pertinent provisions of our Code are:
Revised Statutes of Utah 104-2-5:
"No action for recovery of real property or
the possession thereof shall be maintained ~
it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestotor predecessor #! interest was seized or possessed of
the property in question within seven years before
commencement of the action."
Revised Statutes of Utah 104-2-7:
-.
1n owner:

Possession presumed

"In every action for recovery of real property
·or the possession thereof, the person establishing
a legal title to the property shall be presumed to
have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of the property
by any other person shall be deemed to have been
under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held
and possessed adversely to such legal title for
seven years before the commencement of the action."
Here plaintiff is clearly the owner of the legal title
to the land as shown by the Abstract of Title, plaintiff's
Exhibit A (Tr. 5) and finding of fact numbers two and
three. Appellants do not question this. As we have here·
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tofore shown, P. H. Lo\ve's purchase of the tax title in
1945 did not disturb plaintiff's legal title.
In the case of Sheppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah 131, 138
Pac. 1169, the court said:
.-\.11 presumption that obtains under this
section that defendant's possession was 'in subordination to the legal title' continues until it is
overcome by clear pToof that defendant's possession \vas adverse to such title."
H_•

In this case there is absolutely no "clear proof that
defendant's possession was adverse to such title." On the
contrary, the testimony of the defendant shows a decided
lack of any proof of adverse possession. Since the evidence clearly shows that there was no adverse possession
for seven years before the commencement of this action
and the plain tiff is the holder of the legal title to the
property, the presumption that plaintiff was in possession of the property has not been rebutted and should be
given full effect. Plaintiff then being presumed to have
been in possession is not barred by the statute of limitations from maintaining this action.
Plaintiff's stand on this point is based not only on
the above discussed presumption, but also upon further
affirmative evidence.
P. H. Lowe was asked whether he had seen either
N. J. Meagher or C. W. Showalter, officers of plaintiff
Bank, on the land in 1940. Rather than answer unequivocally, he could only say, "I don't remember." He testified that he did not know Mr. Showalter so, admittedly,
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would not know whether he had been there or not. In the
next instance, however, he did clearly state that he saw
these two men, together with Willis L. Johnson, then
president of plaintiff Bank, at his home adjoining the
property in question in 1940 ( Tr. 107). The testimony
of defendant P. H. Lowe being contradictory as to itself
should not be given effect in overruling the trial court's
finding of fact.
N. J. Meagher, as cashier of the Bank was on the land
in question in 1940 at which time the Bank held legal
title to the land (Tr. 148). He had a great many conversations with Valborg Lowe in the presence of P. H. Lowe
relative to the land in question and her interest in it subsequent to 1933 (Tr. 148, 149, 156 et seq.).
Appellants contend that the word "seized" as used in
the statutory term "seized or possessed of the property"
means nothing more or less than actual possession of the
property in question. This could not be so for obvious
reasons. Could it seriously be considered for a moment
that a landlord who had rented or leased his property
could not maintain an action for the recovery thereof~
That in effect, is what appellants assert. If appellants'
stand were to be set up as a rule, there could be no landlord-tenant relationship nor could a man own more than
one parcel of property or property at a distance from
his home since he could not be in actual possession of such
property at all times and he would be in the untenable
position of not being able to protect his rights in such
property.
There are many cases which state that the word

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
Hseized~'

means something other than actual physical
possession. In South End Mining Co. v. Tinney, 35 Pac.
~~1, ~)-±, 22 Nev. 19, the court said:
"'The 'vord ~seized' as relating to a mine or
claim means something different from simple
possession of a claim or a holding of it in accordance "'\vith the la,vs and customs of miners. It
means, as it "'\vould naturally import, an ownership
in fee for this is the only ownership known to the
law."

In Burdett l;. Burdett, 109 Pac. 922, 926, 26 Okla. 416,
35 L.R.A. ( NS) 964, the court said, "Seized means 'ti tie'
or 'o,vnership' which carries with it the right of possession." In Grant v. Hathaway, 96 S.W. 417, 118 Mo. App.
604, the Court said that the word "seized" used in the same
manner as in the Utah statute under consideration means
possession and ownership. The Washington Supreme
Court held that the rightful owner of land not in the actual, proved adverse possession of another is "seized"
thereof within the meaning of the term "seized or possessed" in the Washington statute of limitations on actions to recover real property. Balc·h v. Smith, 30 Pac.
648, 649, 4 Wash. 497. In Loring v. Arnold, 8A. 335, 15
R. Q. 428, the word "seized" was defined as meaning
"have."
From the foregoing it is apparent that plaintiff Bank
was "seized" of the property in question for seven years
before the commencement of this action and not, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.
The question raised by appellant as to whether the
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statutory limitations are independent of adverse possession could have no effect upon the case at hand since
plaintiff was clearly seized of the property within the
-crucial time. However, it was shown in Sheppick v. Sheppick, supra, that appellants' contention is not sound. It
is there stated that the presumption of the plaintiff's
possession continues until "clear proof that deferidant's
possession was adverse to such title." The question of
adverse possession appears, therefore, to be an essential
in this particular application of the statute of limitations.
It is perfectly true that the statute of limitations applies
to actions in which the element of adverse possession is
completely absent, but it is equally true that in an action
such as the one under consideration, the element of
proved adverse possession is involved. In Balch v. Smith,
supra, the Washington Supreme Court was dealing with
a statute of limitations containing the same terms and
provisions as the Utah Statute, and found it necessary
to include the problem of adverse possession in the decision of the limitation question.
There is ample evidence, both direct and by presumption, to support the trial court's finding of fact to
the effect that plaintiff's action is not barred by the statute of limitations; therefore it should be upheld.

IV.
THAT THE JUDGMENT AGAINST VALBORG B. T.
LOWE IS ENTIRELY PROPER INASMUCH AS SHE WAS
MADE A PARTY DEFENDANT BY STIPULATION OF THE
PARTIES AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.
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\ . . alborg B. T. Lo,ve 'Yas n1ade a party defendant by
~tipulation in the proceedings (Tr. 128) .
. .\ppellanfs attorney requested the joinder of \Talborg Lo,ve.
'~:JIR.

CL ...~WSON: Now this is somewhat
irregular, if the court please, but so that the whole
thing n1ay be before the court, I would like to ask
the "~itness if she is agreeable at this time to be
made a party, so that 've 'von't have anything held
in abeyance.
~IR.

JOHNSON: No objection to it.
HTHE COURT: You may proceed."

H

Utah Rules of C·ivil Procedure Rule 20 (a)
~~Permissive

Joinder of Par~e~s..:. _J\J~ yersons
n1ay be joined.. in one action a~f tlMwe~
is: assert~ agai!H)t them t.iointly, severally, or ill
the alternative~Jany right to relie~ respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all of them will
arise in the action ... Judgment may be given for
one or more of the plaintiff's according to their re~pective rights to relief and against one or more
defendants according to their respective liabilities."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 21 :Misjoinder and
Non-Joinder of Parties:
~'~lisjoinder

of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any
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party or of its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a party may be severed and proceeded
with separately."

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 22:

Int~rpleader.

"Persons having claims against the plaintiff
may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the
plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection~! to
the joinder that the claims of the several claimants
or the titles on which their claims depend do not
have a common origin or are not identical but are
adverse to and independent, of one another, or
that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in
whole or in part to any or all of the claimants ....
The provisions of this rule supplement and do not
in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted
in Rule 20."
The joinder of defendant, P. H. Lowe's sister, Valborg B. T. Lowe, is clearly permissable under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure as above quoted inasmuch as it
appears from the testimony that she may claim an interest in the land in question; consequently, the joinder
of Valborg Lowe, by stipulation as was done was entirely proper and she thereby became a party to the action. Since Miss Lowe did become a party, the case of
Houser v. s·mith, 19 Utah 150, 56 Pac. 683, cited by appellant is not in point. The trial court did have jurisdiction to render its judgment as against Miss Lowe and
its judgment should stand.
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Appellants make various assertions which have no
bearing upon the n1erits of the case. They state that
plaintiff Bank purchased the land in question on foreclosure for the sum of only $1.00. The amount paid by
the plaintiff is clearly beyond the issues, and, for that
matter, the defendant could have redeemed the land for
only $1.00 had he felt the desire to do so. Appellants
state that the plaintiff is activated by the desire to gain
whatever wealth oil 'vill bring. This, of course, has absolutely no bearing on the question of the rights of the parties in the land. The motives of either party can have no
relation to the merits of their respective claims. Why
either respondent or appellant desires a particular purpose or reason is absolutely immaterial.
The respondent wishes forcefully to inm·ite the attention of this honorable court to the fact that the trial judge
viewed the premises with which we are here concerned.
In addition to being in a position to observe and evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony, the
trial court gained first hand know·ledge of the prop·erty
itself. The trial judge was able to see for himself the
condition of the fences on the property in question and to
determine whether the fences were such as to constitute
a "substantial enclosure" as required by Utah law. It is,
therefore submitted that the trial court was in the best
possible position to make proper findings of fact with
respect to the adverse possession urged by appellants.
It is submitted that the findings of fact of the trial
court should be upheld in each instance inasmuch as they
are amply sup·ported by testimony and other evidence
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adduced at the trial. They are not "manifestly contrary
to the evidence" within the meaning of Migliaccio v.
Davis, supra and come within the doctrine expressed in
that case to the effect that under such circumstances the
trial court's findings of fact should be upheld and not
disturbed, and the decree based thereon sustained.

LEE NEFF TAYLOR,
CLYDE S. JOHNSON,
F. A. LINSLEY,
EDWARD G. LINSLEY,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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